QARMA is a new tweakable block cipher used for memory encryption, the generation of short tags and the construction of the keyed hash functions in future. It adopts a three-round Even-Mansour scheme and supports 64 and 128 bits of block size, denoted by QARMA-64 and QARMA-128, respectively. Their tweak lengths equal the block sizes and their keys are twice as long as the blocks. In this paper, we improve the security analysis of reduced-version QARMA against impossible differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks. Specifically, first exploit some properties of its linear operations and the redundancy of key schedule. Based on them, we propose impossible differential attacks on 11-round QARMA-64/128, and meet-in-themiddle attacks on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 and the last 12 rounds of asymmetric QARMA-128. Compared with the previously best known results on QARMA-64, our attack can recover 16 more bits of master key with the almost complexities. Compared with the previously best known results on symmetric QARMA-128, the memory complexity of our attack in Section IV is reduced by a factor of 2 48 . Moreover, the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128 is the best known attack on QARMA-128 in terms of the number of rounds.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Liskov et al. proposed the tweakable block cipher which is widely applied in complex and diversified applications [1] . It has a special public input -the tweak except the normal plaintext, key and ciphertext. Changing the tweak is more easier than changing the keys. Therefore, it is very suitable for various complex applications such as encryption protocols, authentication encryption algorithms and disk encryptions [2] , [3] , to protect the confidentiality and authenticity of the data.
QARMA is a hardware-oriented lightweight tweakable block cipher proposed by Roberto Avanzi in 2017 [4] . It is inspired by PRINCE, MANTIS and Midori, but adopts differential with the probability of zero is called an impossible differential, which is consisted of two truncated differentials with the probability of one resulting in a contradiction in the middle. Then they separately append several rounds E 0 and E 2 at its top and bottom to form an attacking path. According to it, the adversary chooses some plaintext-ciphertext pairs to satisfy the plaintext and ciphertext differences, and then guesses the related round subkeys of E 0 and E 2 . If some plaintext-ciphertext pair can be encrypted or decrypted to obtain the input and output differences of impossible differential under some guessed round subkey, this round subkeys may be wrong and removed from the key space. Finally, the remaining subkey may be correct. Given enough plaintext-ciphertexts, the correct subkey should be recovered. Up to now, many new results have been presented to improve its efficiency, such as the early abort technique [7] , the statetest technique [8] , pre-computation tables [9] and automated algorithms [10] - [14] .
The meet-in-the-middle attack was proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1977 [15] . There are two kinds of attacking methods. The original attacking idea is to find the round subkeys K 1 and K 2 satisfying E 1 (P, K 1 ) = E −1 2 (C, K 2 ) for some plaintext-ciphertext (P, C), where E = E 1 • E 2 and K 1 and K 2 are the related round subkeys of E 1 and E 2 . However, this method cannot attack an amount of block ciphers. Therefore, Demirci et al. proposed a new idea in 2008 to overcome this flaw [16] . They split a block cipher into three subciphers E = E 0 • E 1 • E 2 . In the middle part E 1 , the adversary constructs a distinguisher in a precomputation table, which is some correspondences mapping some active cell of the input to a specific cell of the output. Find the related round subkeys K 0 and K 2 of E 0 and E 2 such that E 0 (P, K 0 ) and E −1 2 (C, K 2 ) can match with the precomputation table for some plaintext-ciphertext (P, C). However, this approach requires high memory to store the precomputation table. After that, researchers proposed several techniques such as multi-set [17] , differential enumeration [17] , sufficient tabulation [18] and key-dependent sieve [19] . Moreover, Guo et al. presented results on meet-inthe-middle attacks on generic Feistel constructions [20] - [22] . These two attacks have been used to analyze the securities of many famous block ciphers successfully, for example, Camellia [23] - [25] , TWINE [26] , [27] , Piccolo [28] , AES [29] and so on.
Up to now, the attacks on QARMA are mainly divided into cryptanalytic results on reduced-version QARMA with symmetric structures and asymmetric structures, respectively. For reduced-version QARMA with the asymmetric structure, there are several cryptanalytic results as follows. In 2016, Zong and Dong proposed an meet-in-the-middle attack on 10 rounds of QARMA-64 with 2 53 chosen plaintexts, 2 116 encryptions and 2 116 blocks [30] . But they could not attack a lot of rounds because of high memory requirements. In 2018, Zong et al. gave an impossible differential attack on 11 rounds of QARMA-64 with 2 61 chosen plaintexts, 2 64.4 encryptions and 2 64 blocks [31] . However, they only gave the time complexity to retrieve 48-bit round subkeys of QARMA-64.
In 2019, Li et al. gave an statistical saturation cryptanalysis of 11 rounds of QARMA-128 with 2 126.1 known plaintexts, 2 126.1 encryptions and 2 71 blocks [32] . For reduced-version QARMA with symmetric structures, there is only one cryptanalytic result, i.e., Li and Jin presented an meet-in-themiddle attack on 10 rounds of QARMA-128 with 2 88 chosen plaintexts, 2 156 encryptions and 2 145 blocks in 2018 [33] . Since they selected two cells as the ordered sequence, their attack required more time and memory complexities. Clearly, papers [31] , [32] and [33] are the previously best known results on QARMA-64/128. For the previous best result on QARMA-64 [31] , they only recover 48 bits of round subkeys in the key recovery phase. Therefore, we try to construct other attacking paths such that more related round subkeys can be retrieved in the key recovery phase in order to improve the cryptanalytic results. For the previous best known result on QARMA-128, paper [32] can be success in a weak attack scenario -the known plaintext attack. But the data complexity is 2 126.1 , which is close to the full code book. In [33] , the meet-in-the-middle distinguisher contains two cells as an ordered sequence, which make this attack require high time and memory complexities. In order to improve these cryptanalytic results, we need build some good distinguishers with one cell output as an ordered sequence, which will reduce the time and memory complexities.
In this paper, we propose improved impossible differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks on the block cipher QARMA-64/128. First, we construct an 4.5-round impossible differential of QARMA-64/128. Based on it, we add 5 rounds at its top and 1.5 rounds at its bottom to attack 11-round QARMA-64/128. The attack on 11-round QARMA-64 requires 2 58.38 chosen plaintext-tweak combinations, 2 69 encryptions (the time complexity in the key recovery phase is 2 64.92 encryptions) and 2 63.38 blocks, and the attack on 11-round QARMA-128 requires 2 111.38 chosen plaintext-tweak combinations, 2 137 encryptions and 2 120.38 blocks, respectively. Second, we present the meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 and the last 12 rounds of asymmetric QARMA-128, both of which contain the outer whitening key layer. For 10-round symmetric QARMA-128, we build a 4.5-round meet-in-the-middle distinguisher. By appending 3 rounds at its top and 2.5 rounds at its bottom, we mount a meet-in-the-middle attack on 10-round QARMA-128, which requires 2 88 chosen plaintext-tweak combinations, 2 164.43 encryptions and 2 97 blocks, respectively. For 12-round asymmetric QARMA-128, we build a 6.5-round meet-in-themiddle distinguisher. By appending 3 rounds at its top and 2.5 rounds at its bottom, we present a meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128, which requires 2 88 chosen plaintext-tweak combinations, 2 155.88 encryptions and 2 154 blocks, respectively. In Table 1 , we summarize our results along with previous attacks on QARMA-64/128. Compared with the previously best known results on QARMA-64/128 [31] , [33] , we can attack the same number of rounds with less complexities or recover more master keys. For 11-round QARMA-64, we can recover 16 more bits of master keys with the almost complexities than the attack in paper [31] . For 10-round symmetric QARMA-128, the memory complexity of our attack are improved by a factor of 2 48 compared with the attack in paper [33] . Moreover, we also propose an meetin-the-middle attack on 12-round asymmetric QARMA-128, which is the best known results on QARMA-128 in terms of the number of rounds.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the QARMA block cipher and some related properties. In Sections 3, we present impossible differential attacks on 11-round QARMA-64/128. In Sections 4, we propose the meet-in-the-middle attack on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 with the outer whitening key layer. In Sections 5, we propose the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round asymmetric QARMA-128 with the outer whitening key layer. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
II. THE DESCRIPTION OF QARMA A. NOTATIONS
• P, C, tk: the plaintext, the ciphertext and the round tweakey;
• P, C: the differences of plaintext and ciphertext, respectively; The cells of marix are numbered in the following order. 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11  12 13 14 15    
The encryption algorithm consists of the forward round function F, the backward round function F and the central round function CR, where the backward round function F is the inverse of the forward round function F, and the central function is designed to be easily inverted. The detailed information can be seen in Figure 1 . The forward round function F consists of four operations, which perform in the following order:
• AddRoundTweakey(ATK ): The internal state is XORed to the round tweakey tk, where tk is the XOR of the round key, tweak and round constant. 
Apply the S-Boxes in parallel for each cell of the internal state. A short version of the round function used in the first and last rounds is to omit the ShuffleCells and MixColumns operations.
The central round function CR consists of two rounds, performed in the following order:
• A forward round function F. • The pseudo-reflector CR consists of ShuffleCells, Mix-Columns, AddRoundTweakey and InverseShuffleCells.
• A backward round function F. QARMA r denotes (2r +2)-round QARMA, which is composed by r-round forward round functions, r-round backward round functions and 2-round central functions. The detailed information can be seen in Figure 2 [4] .
The Tweakey Schedule: The 32b-bit master key is represented as k 0 w 0 . Generate a subkey k 1 and w 1 by k 1 = k 0 and w 1 = (w 0 ≫ 1) ⊕ (w 0 (16b − 1)). The tweak T is updated by two permutations h and ω. The permutation h is
, where h is defined by the permutation h = [6, 5, 14, 15, 0, 1, 2, 3, 7, 12, 13, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11] used in MANTIS. A LFSR ω with the maximal period updates the tweak cells with indexes 0, 1, 3, 4, 8, 11 and 13. For QARMA-
C. DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES
Definition 1 [20] : A l-δ-set is a set of 2 l state values that are all different in l bits (active bits) and all equal in the remaining bits (inactive bits).
Property 1: For a given S-box differential ( x, y), the average number of solutions to S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ x) = y is 1.
Property 2 [33] : Consider a pair (a, d) of 4-byte vectors such that d = M · a. If a = (a[0], a [1] , a [2] , a [3] Proof: By the definition of M , we can obtain the following equations:
Consider a special scenario satisfying the condition, for example a [3] [2] = 0, and a[0], a [1] , a [2] and d [3] are non-zero. That is to say
, we can get d [2] = 0. Therefore, this case happens with the probability 2 −2b . Similarly, other cases can be proved.
III. IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS OF 11-ROUND QARMA-64/128
In this section, we first construct a 4.5-round impossible differential distinguisher. Appending 5 rounds at its top and 1.5 rounds at its bottom, we attack 11-round QARMA-64/128. The detailed information can be found in the following.
A. A 4.5-ROUND IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIAL DISTINGUISHER OF QARMA-64/128
In this sub-section, we present a 4.5-round impossible differential distinguisher of QARMA-64/128 in Proposition 1. [4, 8] are non-zero and the corresponding tweak t 5 [2] is the only active nibble of t 5 . The detailed structure can be seen in Figure 3 .
Proof: In the forward direction, we encrypt V 10 through one round to obtain the value of V 11 = 00α 1 α 2 00α 3 00α 4 000000 with α i = 0(1 ≤ i ≤ 4). Continue to encrypt V 11 through one round to obtain the value of V 12 = 0α 5 α 6 β 1 α 7 0α 8 α 9 α 10 β 2 0α 11 α 12 0α 13 0 with α i = 0(5 ≤ i ≤ 13). In the backward direction, decrypt Z 14 through one round to obtain the value of Z 13 = 0γ 1 0γ 2 0γ 3 0ξ 1 0γ 4 0γ 5 000ξ 2 with γ i = 0(1 ≤ i ≤ 5). Continue to decrypt Z 13 to obtain the value of Z 12 . Clearly, Z 12 [7] = 0, which is contradiction with V 12 [7] = 0. Thus is a 4.5-round impossible differential.
B. THE ATTACKING PROCEDURE OF 11-ROUND QARMA-64/128
Based on the 4.5-round impossible differential distinguisher above, we construct an 11-round impossible differential path of QARMA-64/128 by appending 5 rounds at its top and 1.5 rounds at its bottom. The detailed information can be seen in Figure 4 . Our attack contains two phases, i.e., the data collection and key recovery phases. In data collection phase, we select some plaintext-ciphertext pairs satisfying the attacking path. Based on it, guess the round subkeys of the first 5 rounds and the last 1.5 rounds. If some plaintext-ciphertext can be encrypted or decrypted under the guessed subkeys to obtain the impossible differential, the guessed round subkeys will be removed from the key space. Finally, the correct round subkeys will be left. The detailed steps can be given in the following. 
1) THE DATA COLLECTION PHASE
Define a structure of plaintexts, each of which takes all possible values at P [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14] and t 3 [10] and fixed values at other bytes. One structure contains 2 13b plaintext-tweak combinations. Choose 2 n structures, so there are 2 n+13b plaintexts. Build a hash table to store these plaintexts indexed by the value of C [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14] C [12] ⊕ t 0 [12] . Thus we can collect about 2 n+15b−1 plaintext-ciphertext pairs for QARMA-64/128. Keep the plaintext-ciphertext pairs satisfying P [10] = t 3 [10] . So there are about 2 n+14b−1 plaintext-ciphertext pairs left.
2) THE KEY ROCOVERY PHASE
Before presenting the key recovery phase, we build five precomputation tables to extract the related round subkeys so that the time complexity is reduced.
• H 1 : Guess the values of Z 6 [2, 6] V 5 [3, 6, 9, 12] . Compute the values of X 5 [3, 6, 9, 12] X 5 [3, 6, 9, 12] . Store Z 6 [2, 6] X 5 [3, 6, 9, 12] in H 1 indexed by P [3, 6, 9, 12] , where P [3, 6, 9, 12] = X 5 [3, 6, 9, 12] . Thus H 1 has 2 4b rows, each of which has 2 2b values on average.
• H 2 : Guess the values of Z 6 [3] V 5 [2, 7, 8] . Compute the values of X 5 [2, 7, 8] X 5 [2, 7, 8] . Store Z 6 [3] X 5 [2, 7, 8] [1, 4, 11] . Compute the values of X 9 [1, 4, 11] X 9 [1, 4, 11] . Store Z 6 [9] X 5 [1, 4, 11] in H 3 indexed by P [1, 4, 11] , where P [1, 4, 11] = X 5 [1, 4, 11] . Thus, H 3 has 2 3b rows, each of which has 2 b values on average. [14] . Compute the values of X 5 [14] X 5 [14] . Store V 5 [14] V 5 [14] X 5 [14] in H 5 indexed by P [14] t 4 [14] , where P [14] = X 5 [14] . Thus H 5 has 2 2b rows, each of which has only one values on average.
For each remaining plaintext pairs, do the following steps: 1) Access H 1 to get the value of Z 6 [2, 6] X 5 [3, 6, 9, 12] . So the value of k 0 [3, 6, 9, 12] can be computed by k 0 [3, 6, 9, 12] = P [3, 6, 9, 12 ] ⊕ X 5 [3, 6, 9, 12] . There are 2 2b values of k 0 [3, 6, 9, 12] left. Next, encrypt the plaintexts to obtain the value of Y 6 [2] . Similarly, we can decrypt the ciphertexts to obtain the value of V 15 [9] . Keep those subkeys satisfying V 15 [9] = t 1 [9] . Thus the remaining subkeys is about one. 2) Access H 2 to get the value of Z 6 [3] X 5 [2, 7, 8] . So the value of k 0 [2, 7, 8] [14] X 5 [14] . So the value of k 0 [14] can be computed by k 0 [14] = P [14] ⊕ X 5 [14] . There are 2 b values of k 0 [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15] left.
C. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
There are 15 cells of round subkeys involved in our attack. For each plaintext-ciphertext pair, about 2 b possible round subkeys are removed by the key recovery. Thus, the probability that a wrong key is not discarded for one plaintext-ciphertext pair is 1 − 2 b /2 15b . For 2 n+14b−1 plaintext-ciphertext pairs, there are approximately 2 15b * (1 − 2 −14b ) 2 n+14b−1 ≈ 1 remaining candidates. So n = 6.38 for QARMA-64, and n = 7.38 for QARMA-128. The data complexity is 2 58.38 chosen plaintexts for QARMA-64 and 2 111.38 chosen plaintexts for QARMA-128. The designers claimed that QARMA can offer n bits of security if no better attacks are possible than time 2 n−g− with 2 g chosen or known {plaintext, ciphertext, tweak} triples for a small [4] . Therefore, for QARMA-64 the time complexity should be below 2 128−58.38 = 2 69.62 encryptions, for QARMA-128 the time complexity should be below 2 256−111.38 = 2 144.62 encryptions. In our attack, the time complexity of online phase is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15] . Exhaustively search the remaining 17 cells of subkeys, the time complexity of which is about 2 × 2 17b = 2 17b+1 encryption, i.e., 2 69 for QARMA-64 and 2 137 for QARMA-128. Thus the whole time complexity is about 2 69 encryptions for QARMA-64 and 2 137 encryptions for QARMA-128. The memory complexity is about 2 n+14b−1 × 4 = 2 n+14b+1 blocks, i.e., 2 63.38 for QARMA-64 and 2 120.38 for QARMA-128.
IV. IMPROVED A MEET-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK ON 10-ROUND QARMA-128
In this section, we first construct a new 4.5-round meet-inthe-middle distinguisher in the offline phase. Then we attack 10-round QARMA-128 by appending 3 rounds at its top and 2.5 rounds at its bottom. The detailed information can be found in the following.
A. A 4.5-ROUND MEET-IN-MIDDLE DISTINGUISHER OF QARMA-128
The 4.5-round meet-in-the-middle distinguisher of QARMA-128 is presented as follows.
Proposition 2: Let the first 5 bits of v 3 [1] be active. These all 32 values form the δ-set, denoted by {v 0 3 , v 1 3 , . . . , v 31 3 }. Consider the encryptions of this δ-set through 4.5-round QARMA-128. Then the corresponding 248-bit ordered sequence V 8 [1] (
) only takes about 2 96 values out of 2 248 theoretical values. The detailed information can be found in Figure 5 .
Proof: In the following, we will show that the ordered sequence V 8 [1] is determined by 12 bytes, i.e., Z 5 [0, 4, 12] V 6 [1, 6, 9, 10, 11, 15] V 7 [1, 9, 13] . Specifically, we first select some corresponding tweaks carefully such that t i 3 [1] = V i 3 [1] . Then we can obtain X i 4 = 0 and X 5 [5] = t 4 [5] . Next, guessing the value of Z 5 [0, 4, 12] , we can obtain the value of V 5 [0, 4, 12] . Similarly, guessing the values of V 6 [1, 6, 9, 10, 11, 15] V 7 [1, 9, 13] , we can compute the ordered sequence V 8 [1] .
B. THE ATTACKING PROCEDURE OF 10-ROUND QARMA-128
By appending 3 rounds at the top and 2.5 rounds at the bottom of the 4.5-round distinguisher in Proposition 2, we build a 10-round attacking path of QARMA-128. Guess the related round subkeys of the first 3 rounds and the last 2.5 rounds, and compute the δ-set and the corresponding values of V 8 [1] .
If these values can match with the precomputation table, this guessed round subkeys may be correct. Otherwise, it will be removed from the key space. Finally, the correct subkeys will be retrieved. The detailed information can be found in Figure 6 . In the following, we will present the meet-inthe-middle attack on 10-round QARMA-128. The Offline Phase: Build a precomputation table H to store all the 2 96 ordered sequences V 8 [1] in Proposition 2.
The Online Phase: In the online phase, choose a set of 2 80 plaintexts where P[0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15] takes all the possible values while the other six bytes are constants. Ask for the encryption of each plaintext in the set under 2 8 tweaks where t 0 [5] takes all 2 8 possible values while the other 15 bytes are constants. In total, this attack requires 2 88 plaintext-tweak combinations. For these pairs, execute the following steps.
1) Select a plaintext P 0 and its corresponding tweak T 0 . Deduce the value t 0 , t 1 , t 2 by T 0 . Guess the value of (w 0 ⊕ k 0 )[0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15] . Encrypt one round to obtain the value of V 1 [0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15] . 2) Guess the value of k 0 [0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15] and calculate the value of V 0 3 [1] . 3) According to the δ-set, change the value of V 3 [1] to obtain the sequence V i
, the value of corresponding tweak T i (1 ≤ i ≤ 31) can be known for each V i 3 [1] (1 ≤ i ≤ 31). By the guessed subkeys, we can compute the set of plaintexts P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P 31 . 4) Encrypt these plaintexts P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P 31 to obtain the corresponding ciphertexts C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C 31 . 5) Because w 1 = (w 0 ≫ 1) ⊕ (w 0 (16b − 1)), we can calculate the values of w 1 [0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15] [4] .
V. THE MEET-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK ON 12-ROUND QARMA-128
In this section, we first construct a 6.5-round meet-in-themiddle distinguisher in the offline phase. By appending 3 rounds at its top and 2.5 rounds at its bottom, we attack 12 rounds of QARMA-128. The attacking procedure is similar to the attack in section IV. The detailed information can be found in the following. [9] for 0 ≤ i ≤ 63. The detailed information can be found in Figure 7 .
Proof: In the following, we will show that the ordered sequence e is determined by 19 bytes, i.e., V 10 [1] V 11 [1, 4, 5, 14] V 12 [0, 1, 3, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15 ] V 13 [1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 13] . Specifically, select some corresponding tweaks carefully such that t i 7 = V i 7 . Then we can obtain X i 8 = X i m = X i 9 = 0 and V 10 [1] = t 7 [1] . Next, guessing the value of V 10 [1], we can obtain the value of Z 10 [1] . Similarly, guessing the values of V 11 [1, 4, 5, 14 ] V 12 [0, 1, 3, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15] V 13 [1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 13] , we can compute the ordered sequence e.
B. THE ATTACKING PROCEDURE OF 12-ROUND QARMA-128
By appending 3 rounds at the top and 2.5 rounds at the bottom of the 6.5-round distinguisher in Proposition 3, we build a 12-round attacking path of QARMA-128. The detailed information can be found in Figure 8 . Because the operations ATK , SC and MC are linear, we equivalently swap ATK and SC with MC in our attack so as to reduce the time complexity. Let u 0 be M (T (k 0 )), which is the equivalent subkey. In the following, we will present the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128 including the offline and online phases.
The Offline Phase: We first build a precomputation table H to store all the 2 152 ordered sequences e in Proposition 3.
The Online Phase: In the online phase, choose a set of 2 80 plaintexts where P[0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15] takes all the possible values while the other six bytes are constants. Ask for the encryption of each plaintext in the set under 2 8 tweaks where t 5 [1] takes all the 2 8 possible values while the other 15 bytes are constants. In total, this attack requires 2 88 plaintext-tweak combinations. For each plaintext-ciphertext pair, execute the following steps.
1) Select a plaintext P 0 and its corresponding tweak T 0 . Deduce the value t 5 and t 6 by T 0 . Guess the value of k 0 [0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15] . Encrypt one round to obtain the value of Z 6 . 2) According to the value of k 0 [0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15] , calculate the value of V 0 7 [1] .
3) According to the δ -set, change the values of V 7 [1] to obtain the sequence V i 7 [1] (1 ≤ i ≤ 63). Since V i 7 [1] = t i 7 [1] , we can know the values of corresponding tweaks T i (1 ≤ i ≤ 63) for each V i 7 [1] (1 ≤ i ≤ 63). By the guessed subkeys, we can compute the set of plaintexts P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P 63 . 4) Encrypt these plaintexts P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P 63 to obtain the corresponding ciphertexts C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C 63 . 5) Guess the value of (w 1 ⊕k 0 ) [2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13] . Decrypt these ciphertexts C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C 63 to obtain the value of Z 15 [11, 14] . 6) The value of u 0 [14] can be calculated by the value of k 0 [3, 6, 12] . Guess the value of u 0 [11] to calculate the value of V 15 [11, 14] . According to the value of k 0 [11, 14] , we can calculate the value of Y 14 [1, 9] Y 14 [1, 9] . By Property 2, we can calculate the value of ρ 4 Y 14 [1] ⊕ Y 14 [9] ρ 4 Z 14 [1] ⊕ Z 14 [9] . 7) Guess the value of Z 14 [1] Z 14 [1] . Calculate the value of Z 14 [9] Z 14 [9] . Then V 14 [1, 9] can be computed. Finally, the ordered sequence e can be calculated. 8) Verify whether this ordered sequence satisfy the precomputation table H or not.
In the online phase, we guess 152 bits in total, i.e., k 0 [0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15] u 0 [11] (w 1 ⊕ k 0 ) [2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13] Z 14 [1] Z 14 [1] . Thus about 1 + 2 152 × 2 152 /2 504 ≈ 1 round subkeys are left after the whole attack. Finally, retrieve the master key by the exhaustive search.
C. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The upper data complexity of this attack is about 2 88 plaintext-tweak combinations. The memory complexity is dominated by the size of precomputation [4] .
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes four cryptanalytic results of QAMA-64/128 against impossible differential or meet-in-the-middle attacks. First, construct a 4.5-round impossible differential and mount an impossible differential attack on 11-round QARMA-64/128, which can recover 16 more bits of master key of QARMA-64 with the almost complexities compared with the paper [31] . Second, build a 4.5-round meet-in-the-middle distinguisher to propose an attack on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 with less memory complexity. This attack requires 2 88 chosen plaintext-tweak combinations, 2 164.48 encryptions and 2 97 blocks, respectively. Compared with paper [33] , the memory complexity can be reduced by 2 −48 times. Third, construct a 6.5-round meetin-the-middle distinguisher to attack 12-round asymmetric QARMA-128 with 2 88 chosen plaintext-tweak combinations, 2 156.06 encryptions and 2 154 blocks, which is the best known results on QARMA-128 with the same reduced-version strucutre. In a word, our cryptanalytic results show the lower security bounds of QARMA. 
